Municipal Corporations - Injury Resulting From Mob Action Held Actionable Under Mob Violence Act by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 5 
Issue 2 Spring-Summer 1956 Article 13 
Municipal Corporations - Injury Resulting From Mob Action Held 
Actionable Under Mob Violence Act 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Municipal Corporations - Injury Resulting From Mob Action Held Actionable Under 
Mob Violence Act, 5 DePaul L. Rev. 312 (1956) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol5/iss2/13 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
sideration need be necessary for a lottery to exist; the Court thus holding
the ordinance broader than that of the ordinary lottery statute. In a
recent Connecticut case25 a statute was construed which subjected to fine
or imprisonment, "[a]ny person who shall set up any lottery to raise and
collect money or for the sale of any property or shall by any kind of
hazard, sell or dispose of any kind of property . -.2 It was determined
that the Act prohibited not merely lotteries in the strict sense of the term,
but certainly also covered enterprises in the general nature of a lottery
wherein chance was the predominant element, even though those who
participated directly risk no money or property of their own. The factual
situation in this case closely paralleled that of the instant case. Persons
could register at food stores without making a purchase, for a drawing at
which merchandise would be given away to those whose names were
drawn, whether the winner was present or not. The court, in holding this
a lottery, stressed that the element being prohibited by the statute was the
arousing of the desire to gain somehing for nothing which was present in
that particular scheme.
It becomes evident that such statutes are being construed as prohibiting
not only lotteries in the narrow sense of the word, but also schemes in the
nature of a lottery. By the use of a broad construction, the courts have
been able to strike down schemes which apparently require no considera-
tion, but nonetheless are patent evasions of the spirit, if not the letter of
the statutes. Where such a view is taken, the conflict over what is meant
by consideration as used in the statute is relegated to the position of a
moot question-no longer of any importance in deciding the cases.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-INJURY RESULTING
FROM MOB ACTION HELD ACTIONABLE
UNDER MOB VIOLENCE ACT
Plaintiff, a Negro motorist, suffered personal injuries at the hands of a
group of persons congregated to protest the intrusion of Negro families
into their community. Recovery is sought under the provisions of "An
Act to Suppress Mob Violence."' Plaintiff, who was not one of the new
residents, was driving in the vicinity and was accosted by the crowd and
injuries resulted. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was sustained
by the trial court. The Appellate Court, determining that there was sub-
stantial evidence upon which to submit the case to the jury, reversed and
25 Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 111 A. 2d 4 (1955).
26 Conn. Gen. St. § 8667 (1949).
1 11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, S 512-517.
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remanded the cause with directions. Slaton v. City of Chicago, 8 Ill. App.
2d. 47, 130 N.E. 2d. 205 (1955).
At common law an injured party had no remedy against the political
subdivision in that a failure to prevent riots and maintain the peace was
merely a lapse of governmental duty for which there was no pecuniary
liability.2 Approximately one-half of the states adopted statutes allowing
private actions to redress injuries resulting from mob violence.3 The
rationale supporting the introduction of this legislation is the recognition
of the public duty, entrusted by the state to municipalities and other sub-
divisions, to preserve peace and order and to protect lives and property.4
The need and desire for such legislation was discussed at length in County
of Allegheny v. Gibson5 wherein it was stated:
The principle upon which this legislation rested was that every political sub-
division of the state should be responsible for the public peace and the preser-
vation of private property; and that this end could be best subserved by mak-
ing each individual member of the community surety for the good behavior
of his neighbor and for that of each stranger temporarily sojourning among
them.6
In 1905, Illinois enacted the present law entitled "An Act to Suppress
Mob Violence.' 7 The constitutionality of this statute was challenged and
upheld8 on basis of police power.
The instant case is primarily concerned with one section of the Act,
section 515:
Damage by violence-Penalty-Action against municipality.
Any person or persons composing a mob under the provisions of this act,
who shall by violence inflict material damage to the property or serious injury
to the person of any other person upon the pretense of exercising correctional
powers over such person or persons, by violence and without authority of
law, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall suffer imprisonment in the
penitentiary not exceeding five years; and any person so suffering material
damage to property or injury to person by a mob shall have an action against
the county, park district or city in which such injury is inflicted, for such
damages as he may sustain, to an amount not exceeding ten thousand ($10,-
000.00) dollars.9
2 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3 Ed. 1927) Introd. 5. "An apparent ex-
tension of the historical aphorism, The King can do no wrong." Gianfornte v. New
Orleans, 61 Fed. 64, 66 (1894).
3For a detailed discussion, see McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 2821, 2822
(rev. ed. 1939).
4 Pennsylvania Co. v. City of Chicago, 81 Fed. 317 (1897); Pittsburgh, C.,C. and St.
L. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 242 I11. 178, 89 N.E. 1022 (1909).
5 90 Pa. St. 397 (1879). 6 Ibid., at 418.
7I11. Rev. Star. (1955) c. 38, § 512-517.
SChicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
9 See I11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, § 512. Numerically, five or more are needed to
compose a mob.
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The main consideration before the court is interpreting the language of
the statute to determine within what limits the remedy should extend. A
primary tenet is construing the language of legislation both remedial and
penal in character is to afford a liberal interpretation. 0 It is universally
recognized that such statutes should not be so strictly consrued as to de-
feat the obvious intent of the legislature.11 The consequential result is that
court decisions rest to a great extent upon the facts of the case before the
court.
The Illinois court has chosen to disregard past interpretations of the
Illinois Act, and the interpretations of similar acts in other jurisdictions,
by labeling them as not in point. 2 These Illinois cases interpreting the
language of the Act, indicate that a prerequisite to recovery is the neces-
sity of showing that the mob intended to exercise correctional powers
over the party who suffered the injury. In Barnes v. City of Chicago,'8
recovery was sought under a section of the act requiring that the injured
party be the object of the lynch mob. Recovery was denied because the
injured party was merely an officer of the law assigned to restraining the
mob. The court declared that an essential element in stating a cause of
action was the showing that the person injured was charged or at least
suspected of some crime. Again in Anderson v. City of Chicago,14 where
an innocent bystander was injured by police who were dispersing the mob,
recovery was denied due to the fact that the claimant was not the one
over whom the mob intended to exercise control, and, consequently, he
was not entitled to a remedy under the Act.
It appears that these decisions have been predicated upon the inter-
10Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 238 Mass. 538, 131 N.E. 220 (1921). Remedial so far
as it provides compensation to the injured party, and penal so far as it rendered the
city responsible for the results of mob violence.
11Long v. City of Neenah, 128 Wis. 40, 107 N.W. 10 (1906); Barnes v. Chicago,
225 Ill. App. 31 (1922); Burgis v. County of Philadelphia, 169 Pa. Super, 23, 82 A. 2d
561 (1951).
12Barnes v. City of Chicago, 323 Ill. 203, 153 N.E. 821 (1926); Kennedy v. City of
Chicago, 340 Ill. App. 100, 91 N.E. 2d 138 (1950); Anderson v. City of Chicago, 313
Ill. App. 616, 40 N.E. 2d 601 (1942); Hailey v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. Misc. 139,
36 A.2d 210 (1944); Lexa v. Zmunt, 123 Ohio St. 510, 176 N.E. 82 (1931); Hammett
v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N.E. 36 (1932).
18323 111. 203, 153 N.E. 821 (1926). This case is distinguished from the instant case
in that it was brought under a different section of the Act, expressly requiring the
ingredient mentioned.
Its value in interpreting the Act lies in its being a reversal of the Appellate Court's
decision in Barnes v. Chicago, 225 111. App. 31, 35, (1922), in which the court stated,
"The result of lynching is no less serious to the community, or persons affected,
whether the mob extends its violence on a particular party against whom it purposes
vengeance or some innocent bystander."
14313 Ill. App. 616, 40 N.E. 2d 601 (1942).
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pretation of the words, ". .. upon the pretense of exercising correctional
powers over such person or persons."15
The court in the instant case interpreted the wording of the Act so as to
bring the particular facts of the case within it. The court first established
the meaning of the activity, concluded that it was mob activity, and then
resolved it to the Act. The court said that the mob was not acting to pro-
mote their individual interests when they undertook to prevent the en-
trance of Negroes into the community but rather that they wrongfully
assumed to be a collective community interest. 16 The court said:
We believe a more logical interpretation of the statute would allow recov-
ery under the Act in those cases where it is shown that the unlawful crowd of
people was assembled for the purpose of carrying out 'what it believed was its
collective or community interest, and in the execution of that purpose took
over the powers lawfully delegated to and vested in the local authorities in
order to exercise such powers correctionally and summarily over the plain-
tiff.17
The interpretation accorded the Act is unique to Illinois law. Language
closest to that adopted by the court is found in Justice Treanor's dissent
in an Indiana decision, where a similar statute was construed to include
the use of violence by a mob or riotous assemblage for the purpose of
compelling other persons to conform to the ideas and standards of con-
duct of the persons using the violence.' 8 He stated that the evil aimed at
in these statutes is the substitution of the exercise of the power of private
individuals for the orderly exercise of power of the State.' 9
The case of Reynolds v. Lathrop20 is another instance of a court con-
struing the phrase "exercising correctional powers" in an Ohio act. There
the court determined that the words indicate an unlawful attempt by a
mob to mete out justice by physical force and violence to a real or sup-
posed wrongdoer. In a criminal prosecution in New Jersey,21 the court
declared that "exercising correctional power" as regards mob action must
be directed towards some one charged with a crime.22
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, § 515.
16 Slaton v. City of Chicago, 8 111. App. 2d 47, 130 N.E. 2d 205 (1955).
17 Ibid., at 58 and 210. Emphasis added.
18 Shake v. Board of Com'rs of Sullivan County, 210 Ind. 61, 1 N.E. 2d 132 (1936).
The majority of the court offered a strict interpretation of the statute. The court
limited recovery to injuries inflicted by persons who have usurped and assumed
power to regulate and correct individuals who have violated some supposed law.
19 Ibid.
20 133 Ohio St. 435, 14 N.E. 2d 599 (1938). It should be noted that the court in the
instant case dismissed this case as not being on point. This dismissal is based upon a
distinction of fact.
21 State v. Algor, 26 N.J. Super. 527, 98 A. 2d 340 (1953).
22 As established in Wells Fargo and Co. v. Mayor and Alderman of Jersey City,
207 Fed. 871 (D.C. N.J. 1913), 219 Fed. 699 (C.A. 3d 1915), statutes in derogation of
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The hesitation of the courts in past decisions in affording too liberal an
interpretation of the language of the Act is undoubtedly a repercussion
of a fear that a contrary holding would result in persons obtaining relief
who were not contemplated by the legislature to be entitled to relief.
The decision in the instant case allows recovery in an area where recov-
ery has been heretofore denied. In the past, courts have limited recovery
to those persons injured by a mob who were charged, or at least suspected
of some crime. Now, the boundary lines of recovery have been extended
to include those instances where an injury resulted when a mob was act-
ing to protect what it believed was a "community interest."
There is evidence of the court's hesitation to allow any interpretation
of its decision as a change or exception to any established legal concepts.
The court stated:
We are of the opinion that it was the legislative intent in enacting the law
to impose a penalty upon the community in the form of additional taxes when
its members participate in or allow the condition to arise that we find in the
instant case.23
It is to be remembered that the plaintiff here has not yet won his case.
The decision that he has made out a prinma facie case under the statute is a
major hurdle. It is submitted that the court in the instant case has correct-
ly effectuated the intent of the legislature in the application of the statute.
The original purpose of the Act was to counteract strike violence and
lynching. It can reasonably be said that these activities and the activities
of the mob in the instant case are akin. Both are a dangerous disruption of
law and order. Both can easily become uncontrollable. Both are inclined
to cause serious bodily harm to innocent persons. If mob action is to be
conquered by a pecuniary penalty on the community, it would seem that
this case should occasion a valid infliction of that penalty.
PROPERTY-MURDER BY JOINT TENANT EXTIN-
GUISHES RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
Lawrence and Matilda Fox, husband and wife, were owners of certain
real property which they held in joint tenancy. Lawrence Fox murdered
his wife and three days later conveyed the premises. Fox was convicted of
the murder and sentenced to the State Penitentiary.
The administrator of the estate of the decedent and her daughter by
the common law should be strictly construed (if not both penal and remedial in
character).
23 Slaton v. City of Chicago, 8 11. App. 2d 47, 59, 130 N.E. 2d 205, 211 (1955). Em-
phasis added.
